Eilam Shapira

Human choice prediction in economic contexts is crucial for applications in marketing, finance, public policy, and more. This task, however, is often constrained by the difficulties in acquiring human choice data. With most experimental economics studies focusing on simple choice settings, the AI community has explored whether LLMs can substitute for humans in these predictions and examined more complex experimental economics settings. However, a key question remains: can LLMs generate training data for human choice prediction? We explore this in language-based persuasion games, a complex economic setting involving natural language in strategic interactions. Our experiments show that models trained on LLMgenerated data can effectively predict human behavior in these games and even outperform models trained on actual human data.

Tabular Foundation Models have recently established the state of the art in supervised tabular learning, by leveraging pretraining to learn generalizable representations of numerical and categorical structured data. However, they lack native support for unstructured modalities such as text and image, and rely on frozen, pretrained embeddings to process them. On established Multimodal Tabular Learning benchmarks, we show that tuning the embeddings to the task improves performance. Existing benchmarks, however, often focus on the mere co-occurrence of modalities; this leads to high variance across datasets and masks the benefits of task-specific tuning. To address this gap, we introduce MulTaBench, a benchmark of 40 datasets, split equally between image-tabular and text-tabular tasks. We focus on predictive tasks where the modalities provide complementary predictive signal, and where generic embeddings lose critical information, necessitating Target-Aware Representations that are aligned with the task. Our experimental results demonstrate that the gains from target-aware representation tuning generalize across both text and image modalities, several tabular learners, encoder scales, and embedding dimensions. MulTaBench constitutes the largest image-tabular benchmarking effort to date, spanning high-impact domains such as healthcare and e-commerce. It is designed to enable the research of novel architectures which incorporate joint modeling and target-aware representations, paving the way for the development of novel Multimodal Tabular Foundation Models.

Post-training alignment optimizes language models to match human preference signals, but this objective is not equivalent to modeling observed human behavior. We compare 120 base-aligned model pairs on more than 10,000 real human decisions in multi-round strategic games - bargaining, persuasion, negotiation, and repeated matrix games. In these settings, base models outperform their aligned counterparts in predicting human choices by nearly 10:1, robustly across model families, prompt formulations, and game configurations. This pattern reverses, however, in settings where human behavior is more likely to follow normative predictions: aligned models dominate on one-shot textbook games across all 12 types tested and on non-strategic lottery choices - and even within the multi-round games themselves, at round one, before interaction history develops. This boundary-condition pattern suggests that alignment induces a normative bias: it improves prediction when human behavior is relatively well captured by normative solutions, but hurts prediction in multi-round strategic settings, where behavior is shaped by descriptive dynamics such as reciprocity, retaliation, and history-dependent adaptation. These results reveal a fundamental trade-off between optimizing models for human use and using them as proxies for human behavior.

AI agents increasingly mediate bargaining, negotiation and persuasion for people and firms. Such markets extend software-mediated commerce, but add a governance problem: independent model releases change delegates available to participants. Game theory shows that expanding a strategy set can harm equilibrium outcomes, but mostly through constructed examples. Deployed AI-agent logs are scarce, proprietary and privacy-sensitive, and lack counterfactuals and payoff labels. We therefore use GLEE, an independently collected benchmark of 587K strategic decisions by 13 large language models across 1,320 matched bargaining, negotiation and persuasion configurations, to study model release as strategy expansion. Across more than 50,000 release comparisons, many releases move payoffs in opposite directions: one agent gains while the other loses. We identify the Poisoned Apple effect: a released model that no agent adopts in equilibrium nevertheless shifts payoffs in opposite directions and changes the regulator’s market design. Up to roughly three in ten opposing shifts arise this way, and technology restrictions can amplify the effect.

While deep learning has achieved remarkable success across many domains, it has historically underperformed on tabular learning tasks, which remain dominated by gradient boosting decision trees. However, recent advancements are paving the way for Tabular Foundation Models, which can leverage real-world knowledge and generalize across diverse datasets, particularly when the data contains free-text. Although incorporating language model capabilities into tabular tasks has been explored, most existing methods utilize static, target-agnostic textual representations, limiting their effectiveness. We introduce TabSTAR: a Tabular Foundation Model with Semantically Target-Aware Representations. TabSTAR is designed to enable transfer learning on tabular data with textual features, with an architecture free of dataset-specific parameters. It unfreezes a pretrained text encoder and takes as input target tokens, which provide the model with the context needed to learn task-specific embeddings. TabSTAR achieves state-of-the-art performance for both medium- and large-sized datasets across known benchmarks of classification tasks with text features, and its pretraining phase exhibits scaling laws in the number of datasets, offering a pathway for further performance improvements.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have spurred interest in designing LLM-based agents for tasks that involve interaction with human and artificial agents. This paper addresses a key aspect in the design of such agents: predicting human decisions in off-policy evaluation (OPE). We focus on language-based persuasion games, where an expert aims to influence the decision-maker through verbal messages. In our OPE framework, the prediction model is trained on human interaction data collected from encounters with one set of expert agents, and its performance is evaluated on interactions with a different set of experts. Using a dedicated application, we collected a dataset of 87K decisions from humans playing a repeated decision-making game with artificial agents. To enhance off-policy performance, we propose a simulation technique involving interactions across the entire agent space and simulated decision-makers. Our learning strategy yields significant OPE gains, e.g., improving prediction accuracy in the top 15% challenging cases by 7.1%.1

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLMbased agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents’ performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents. We believe that our framework can contribute to the growing intersection of LLMs, ML, and economics, and we encourage researchers to explore it further and build on its foundation.